We present the results of an experiment measuring social preferences within couples in a context where intra-household pay-off inequality can be reduced at the cost of diminishing household income. We measure social norms regarding this efficiency-equality trade-off and implement a cross-country comparison between France and Germany. In particular, we show that German households are more inequality averse and thus less income-maximizing than French households. Decomposition reveals that diverging sample compositions in the two countries drive less than half of the difference, while over half of the initial French/German difference remains unexplained. Beliefs differ significantly from observed behavior in both countries. Incomemaximizing choices are overestimated in the German sample and underestimated in the French. JEL Codes: C71, C91, C92, D13
Introduction
There is common agreement that culture shapes many areas of economic life. The interaction of family members in particular is at least as much affected by existing family and gender norms as by the economic and institutional environment. However, studying the impact of differences in norms requires disentangling them from any interactions related to economic factors and institutions.
France and Germany happen to be very close neighbors, both being Western European countries with comparable cultural traits and very similar degree of economic and social development. However they are characterized by fundamental differences concerning family norms and gender roles. This makes them a particularly interesting case to investigate. Observing individual and household decisions in France and in Germany and controlling for differences in sample characteristics thus enables us to investigate the importance of differences that stem from norms and culture. Fertility in France is at a persistently higher level than in Germany (presently 2.0 versus 1.34, Eurostat 2013) . After the birth of a child, most French women remain closely connected to the labor market whereas many German mothers reduce their employment hours in order to take care of their (even smaller number of) children. According to Eurostat (2013) only 36% of employed women work part time in France, compared to 66% in Germany. Given also the smaller gender pay gap in the French labor market, intra-household income differences tend to be lower in France than in Germany.
Regarding institutions, family policy is somewhat different in the two countries. The supply of subsidized child-care for children less than three years old has been increasing in recent years in Germany, but public institutions provide far more facilities for external child-care in France (BMFSFJ 2008 and OECD 2011a) . Regarding values, cross-cultural comparison faces a much higher complexity. A widely accepted cultural categorization developed for the professional sphere 1 asserts the French society to present rather 'feminine' traits where (emotional) gender roles overlap (Hofstede et al., 2010) . The German society, on the contrary, is said to be more masculine, i.e. material success has higher priority and gender roles appear more differentiated. Since these differences can give further rise to income inequalities within German couples compared to French couples, they may also be the cause of different norms concerning equality among spouses. Furthermore the Hofstede categorization includes the dimensions of power distance and individualism. The French society scores particularly high on power distance, a trait that specifies that "the less powerful members of a society accept and expect that power is distributed unequally". Power distance might thus lead families to accept more readily inequalities among its members. The French society further presents a relatively high score concerning individualism. Though also highly individualistic societies consider the immediate family to be part of their immediate responsibility, high individualism might lead to 3 pessimistic belief concerning the willingness of other members of the society to help or share. To illustrate the consequences of these opposing cultural backgrounds, we present an experiment designed to measure social preferences within the family using a simple allocation task that implies an intrahousehold equality-efficiency trade-off.
Many econometric studies measure cross-country variations of income inequality aversion using survey data. Among these, Clark and Senik (2010) discover larger inequality aversion in France than in Germany. However, cross-cultural experiments based on actual behavior are scarce. 2 A specificity of our approach is that we focus on intra-household income inequality tolerance, which may be of importance in understanding the gender-biased arrangements within families. In our design, reducing intra-household inequality has a household cost that hinders maximization of household income. In this respect, our analysis is also related to the experimental literature that aims at experimentally testing the efficiency of household decision-making. For example Iversen et al. (2006) used a field experiment to analyze a social dilemma game between couples in rural Uganda and Peters et al. (2004) perform laboratory experiments where the participants are involved in a public good game with varying counterparts. The latter study finds that family members contribute more to the public good when grouped together than when playing with strangers. Cochard et al. (2009) Carlsson et al. (2012) , Kebede et al. (2013) , Mani (2008) and Robinson (2008) they find inefficiency in couples' decisions, whereas Bobonis (2008) does not reject the efficiency assumption. Further, as shown by an experiment in Germany by Beblo and Beninger (2012) , even under forced cooperation, intra-household distribution of resources depends strongly on each spouse's contribution to the household budget, although pooling is positively related to total household income.
This result indicates egoistic behavior of the spouses, potentially explaining inefficient decisionmaking in couples.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the intra-household allocation task and the theoretical predictions. Experimental procedures are presented in section 3. Couples' decisions and beliefs are analyzed respectively in section 4 and 5. Section 6 concludes.
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Task and Predictions
The task (see Table 1 ) consists of five consecutive rounds concerning a payoff allocation between spouses. For rounds 1 and 2, income maximization implies self-sacrifice. Both spouses respond to this task but only one of the two is later randomly selected as decision maker and one randomly selected round is paid out. No interaction between the spouses is allowed. Each round consists of selecting either an equal allocation to both partners (option A: 200 units for the couple split equally) or a higher joint payoff for both partners where inequality between partners varies across rounds (option B: 300 units for the couple). Decisions in this task are closely related to established models of household behavior (for an overview see e.g. Chiappori and Donni, 2009 ). Efficient models (whether 'unitary', issued from cooperative game theory, or 'collective') predict the maximization of household income. Non-cooperative models predict similar results to a game played amongst strangers where joint income is not necessarily maximized. Behavior would depend on social preferences amongst spouses. Hence, our task allows the classification of participants based on their revealed preferences for either: joint income maximization, own income maximization or partner's income maximization. Participants that prefer option A for the extreme rounds and option B for the middle rounds can be further classified as having some concern for equality. It has to be noted of course that participants had the possibility to choose the higher but unequal earnings in option B and then pool and divide them equally with their partners after the experiment. That is to say, inequality aversion did not necessarily prevent them from choosing B and the number of those choosing option A is only a lower bound estimate of the number of inequality averse participants (for a more detailed discussion of this see Cochard et al., 2009) . We hence expect a bias towards joint income maximizing choices.
Participants were also asked to predict the average behavior of all participating men and women from their country. These questions consisted of the same five rounds presented above and participants were asked to indicate how many participants out of 100 they believe to have chosen either option A or option B. We use beliefs about behavior from other participants as an indicator of the perceived social norms in either country.
Experiment
Participants
The experiments were held in May and June 2010 in two medium-sized cities in France and Germany (Toulouse and Mannheim). In both locations, established, heterosexual couples were invited to participate in an economic study, promoted through newspaper reports and flyers. Only couples living together for at least one year were eligible to participate. A total of 156 observations were involved (France: 69, Germany: 87), i.e. 312 participants. In France, the average age for men was 36 years and for women 35 years. In Germany, the average age for men was 41 years and for women 39 years. In France, 45% of participating couples were married, with an average relationship duration of 10 years, while 52% of German couples were married, with an average relationship duration of 13 years. 70% of the French, but only 40% of the German participants achieved a university degree. This rather large deviation may unsettle at first glance but it is qualified by very different vocational training systems in the two countries. In fact the majority of German employees dispose of a vocational training certificate which ranges somewhat between secondary and tertiary education. Given these numbers our samples are clearly biased towards high-skilled participants, a fact not surprising given the voluntary nature of our study. Covering an age range from 7 20 to above 80 years our samples, however, display larger heterogeneity than the typical student samples and are closer to a typical population sample (further details see Appendix table) . 
Procedures
In Germany, the experiment was conducted by paper and pencil, with sessions involving eleven to fifteen couples. In France, the experiment was computerized, and limited to six couples per session.
The same task was previously investigated in France with a paper and pencil protocol producing qualitatively very similar results (see Cochard et al., 2009) . The different presentation of tasks does therefore not seem to impose a treatment variation. The remaining experimental procedures were identical in the two locations. Instructions and presentations of the choice task were translated to German based on the French original used in Cochard et al. (2009) . Payoffs from the experiment were converted into euros in the two locations according to an exchange rate specified at the beginning of the experiment (10 units = 1 euro in Germany and 20 units = 1 euro in France).
During the study participants could not communicate with others, neither with their spouses nor with other participants. Spouses were physically separated and placed such that they could not communicate during the study. From the beginning of the study it was stressed that decisions were individual, private and anonymous with respect to the experimenters, other participants and their spouse. Final earnings were determined by one randomly selected choice from either the man or the woman. To ensure that subjects did not receive feedback on their partner's decision through observed payments, this experiment was part of a larger study (other tasks not described in this paper). Global earnings did not allow participants to deduce the actions of their partner. For more details on the experimental design see the Appendix.
Decisions
We first present the aggregate results of choosing the higher joint income option (option B) for each of the five rounds of the distribution task. Figure 1 illustrates the outcomes by gender for both countries.
Results in France are very similar to earlier results obtained by Cochard et al. (2009) . Approximately 74% of participants choose the efficient option for each of the five rounds. Decisions are symmetric concerning the inequality in option B. The difference compared with the German sample is particularly noteworthy. Choices are also symmetric concerning inequality in option B, however a much larger proportion of participants selected the equal outcome, i.e. option A. Specifically for the extreme rounds less than 50% of participants selected option B, and for the two intermediate rounds only slightly more than half selected option B. In both countries, we observe that men selected the efficient option B generally more often than women. Although the gender difference tends to be more pronounced in Germany, it is not statistically significant in either sample. 4 The observed differences for round 3, where participants had to choose between a 100/100 or 150/150 allocation, might suggest much more errors made by the German sample (13% choose B versus 3% in France). However, these numbers have to be taken in relation to the number of participants taking also A options into account.
Due to the lower ratio of participants in Germany that always choose B (39% in Germany versus 74%
in France), the relative error rate diminishes to 21%, versus 17% in France. We nonetheless conducted robustness checks with the reduced sample of participants choosing B in round 3 in all remaining analyses but did not encounter any statistically significant differences. Note : These graphs illustrate the percentages of women and men in each country sample that have opted for option B (higher total income but varying unequal shares between me/spouse) against option A (lower total income, equal shares). For example, in the first columns the participant receives 0 and the spouse receives 300 when choosing option B, instead of receiving 100 each when choosing option A.
It should also be noted that due to the experimental exchange rate being twice as favourable in Germany compared to France, the absolute gains from choosing the maximizing option B were twice as high in Germany. Hence, if absolute gains from choosing the total income maximizing option increase its attractiveness, we would expect more participants choosing option B in Germany. This is obviously not the case.
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We can further use data from the decision task to classify participants into different categories. We present the distribution of these types for the French and German sample in Figure 2 . Approximately 74% of participants in the French sample always choose B and can thus be classified as joint income maximizers. Again the difference compared with the German sample is noteworthy. In the German sample less than 40% of participants can be classified as income maximizers. An almost equally large group can be classified as having some concern for inequality aversion. Note: Subjects who 'Maximize joint income' are those who always choose option B; 'Inequality averse symmetric' subjects are those who sometimes choose option A (100/100), but behave the same way whether self or spouse is disadvantaged by the inequality in option B; 'Inequality averse egoistic' subjects are more inequality averse for themselves than for their partner; 'Inequality averse altruistic' subjects are more inequality averse for their partner than for themselves. Participants who select option A in the third round when option B (150/150) would be more beneficial for both are classified as 'Irrational'. 5 We considered whether the utility function induces greater inequality aversion simply due to higher stakes. However, none of the standard utility functions has this property: Let (x, y) be a distribution of income between me (x) and my partner (y). Let U(x, y) be my utility function over payoffs. In our experiment, subjects have to choose between an equal option (w/2, w/2) and an unequal but income maximizing option (tx, (1-t)x), with t between 0 and 1 and x > w. Let λ > 0 be the exchange rate in euros (amount of euros per experimental point, larger in Germany). We have to investigate whether the sign of ΔU(λ) = U(λtx, λ(1-t)x) -U(λw/2, λw/2) changes with λ, reflecting the fact that the choice between the equal option and the income maximizing option is affected by the exchange rate. This is neither the case with the Fehr-Schmidt (1999) inequality aversion model: U(x,y) = x -α(y-x) if y≥x, and = x -β(x-y) if x≥y, with 0 ≤ β ≤ α and β < 1 nor the Charness and Rabin (2002) The asymmetry in preferences across countries is also reflected in the outcomes on the couples' level.
When we look at both spouses' choices, we find that in 59% of French couples both spouses maximize household income. In the German sample, both spouses maximize joint income in only 22% of the cases. By contrast, for 26% of the German couples both partners act in a manner demonstrating inequality aversion.
In order to assess the importance of various socio-economic variables for the individual efficiencyequality trade-off decision we apply a multivariate logistic regression analysis of the propensity to choose option B for each country sample and each round separately. In Table 2 we chose to present the estimation results of the two regressions for the first round (I receive 0, my partner receives 300) since we consider it the most crucial in terms of inequality disfavoring the individual herself. Regressions for rounds 2, 4 and 5 show slightly different results, but F-tests are not significant. Besides, decisions are symmetric (choosing Option B in round 1 and in round 5) for the majority of the participants. The detailed regression results are provided in the Appendix. Overall, the estimates show that the preference for option B is explained by very different factors in the two countries.
Among the German participants we see that higher educated participants with children are more likely to choose efficiency over equity, whereas among French participants the preference for efficiency is related to income level and unequal incomes within the household. Other characteristics do not seem to be statistically related to the choices made. Both the descriptive statistics presented above (Figure 1 ) and the regression results regarding the participants' decisions reveal marked differences in behavior in both France and Germany. This may in part be due to differing mean characteristics between the French and the German samples. We are able to control for these differences by the use of the decomposition technique initiated by Oaxaca (1973) and Blinder (1973) . Here the expected difference between French and German choices is rewritten as the sum of two terms. The first term reflects that share of the choice deviation which arises from differences in the average characteristics between both samples. The second term is the portion due to differences in the estimated coefficients, i.e. it represents that part of the observed mean difference between choices in France and Germany that is due to systematically differing preferences in both countries. For this purpose, we introduce the counterfactual variable
which gives the imputed choices of the German participants in the hypothetical case they had the same average characteristics as the French sample:
When applying this equation to the estimated coefficients (see Table 3 ) and average characteristics (see Section 3) of our data, we find that 30 to 48% of the mean differences in choices between French and German participants across rounds can be explained by differences in the observed characteristics of both participant samples (see Table 4 ). The remaining half to over two thirds are due to differences in estimated coefficients, depending on the specific round looked at. Table 3 and Appendix Table B . For round 3, the share due to differing sample characteristics is 98%, revealing that the larger fraction of "irrationally acting" German participants who choose option B in round 3 (when there is only to lose) is almost completely explained by differing characteristics between the samples. However, we have to note that in this round the French estimation results are based on very low heterogeneity of the outcome variable.
We interpret this as the result of overall differences between our French and German samples that might be attributed to culture or other unobserved characteristics of the couple or the society. We can therefore conclude that preferences towards equity vs. efficiency differ, even when holding a standard set of observable characteristics constant. The conditional difference, however, is less prominent than observed at first glance. This is particularly true for choices that favor the partner's outcome (in rounds 1 and 2).
Beliefs
In this section, we analyze beliefs by men and women concerning the average behavior of all participating men and women (from their country) in the study. We observe that beliefs differ significantly from observed behavior. Moreover the type of mistakes made differ across the two countries and gender.
From Figure 3 we see that gender differences in beliefs appear to be negligible for rounds 1, 2 and 3 in both countries, although men are always expected to be more prone to select the efficient option.
However, women are expected to be less selfish on average than men, in particular in Germany, as half of the German women, but 60% of the men, are expected to choose option B in round 5. Figure 4 shows even more differentiated gender-and country-specific patterns. The graphs show the distribution of an indicator of asymmetry in female and male expectations regarding female and male choices in rounds 1 and 2, relative to expectations for rounds 4 and 5. Specifically, the more the lines are skewed to the left, the more the participants are expected to be egoistic. On the contrary, the more the lines are skewed to the right, the more the participants are expected to be altruistic. The figure reveals that in Germany, women are believed to be more egoistic particularly by men, whereas in France, men are expected to be significantly more egoistic on average by women than by themselves.
Jarque-Bera tests show that the normality assumption is rejected at the 5% significance level for female expectations on female choices and male expectations on male choices in France, and male beliefs about female behavior in Germany. At the 10% level the normality assumption is also rejected for male beliefs regarding female behavior in France. For the remaining gender-and country-specific subgroups, we can accept statistically the hypothesis that participants believe in people behaving symmetrically. Hence, we measure significant differences in gender-specific beliefs across and within countries on individual preferences for equity vs. efficiency. This leads us to conclude that the social norms concerning these beliefs differ between men and women on the one hand, and France and Germany on the other hand. Beyond this, in France, people are expected to be less efficient, i.e. income-maximizing, than they actually are, whereas in Germany people are expected to be more efficient than they actually are (except for round 3), as illustrated by Figure 5 . It shows, for each round and country sample, the differences between expected and actual behavior (i.e. subtracting Figure 1 from Figure 3 ). For example, in France altruistic behavior by men is underestimated by 23.4 percentage points (round 1), respectively 22.5 percentage points (round 2). The numbers for French women are similar, but somewhat smaller. In Germany, women's altruism is overestimated by 14.2 percentage points, respectively 2.9 percentage points, while men behave more or less as expected when averaging over the first two rounds. Interestingly, errors in expectations tend to be symmetric in Germany, whereas they tend to be asymmetric in France, reflecting the belief that French participants are egoistic, although they actually have symmetric choices.
Beliefs concerning egoistic choices by others can be linked to the observation that general trust in
France is somewhat lower than in Germany (World Values Survey, 2011; Cahuc and Algan, 2007; Willinger et al., 2003) . 
Conclusion
In summary, there is a substantial difference in French and German couples' efficiency-equality tradeoff decisions. While approximately three quarters of French participants always choose the income maximizing option for the couple instead of the equal repartition between spouses, this is the case for less than half of the German participants. However, inequality aversion seems symmetric in both samples. When making the country samples more comparable by controlling for a standard set of socio-economic variables, at least 50% of the initial French/German difference remains unexplained.
That is, although the groups vary significantly in terms of socio-economic characteristics and environments, up to one half and more of the observed heterogeneity across French and German couples seems to be driven by sample differences in distributional preferences and norms. Part of the variation in behavior may also be explained by differing prices and institutions, particularly in the labour or the marriage market, that have not been adressed by the included socio-economic variables.
Given that the included socio-economic variables are generally considered to characterize economic constraints our results show that other characteristics of a country need to be considered. This is in line with research showing that cultural differences concerning family arrangements can persist even when migrants are exposed to a new cultural environment (Giuliano, 2007) . The fact that our data are collected in an experimental context, and that we have a large and heterogeneous subject pool with more than 300 non-student participants, leads us to extrapolate this finding, at least to the Toulouse and Mannheim regions.
Furthermore, beliefs differ significantly from observed behavior in both countries. In the German sample income-maximizing choices are overestimated, while in the French sample they are underestimated and people expect much more egoism than actually exists. Consistent with the cultural categorization of the French and the German societies by Hofstede et al. (2010) our results point at differing norms concerning equality among spouses in the two countries. French couples seem to accept more readily differences in earnings from the experimental task, a result that can be interpreted as being in line with the higher power distance observed for French society. In contrast beliefs in
France suggest that others are expected to act more egoistically. This can be interpreted as being in line with the higher value of individualism in France. Having shown that spouses' behavior can differ widely between two neighboring countries of reasonably similar economic background, we can therefore stress the importance of taking into account cross-cultural differences when considering the potential effects of social and family policy measures. 
